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Abstract
This Master's Thesis proposes an extension to an existing Anonymous Peer-to-peer network, 
to make it resilient to churn and tampering.
The thesis starts by presenting the existing Network Coding-based Anonymous Peer-to-peer 
Network of Wang et al. that provides advantages over earlier system from the viewpoints of  
computational  efficiency  and  level  of  anonymity  provided.  That  system  consists  of  well-
known and -researched building blocks, such as Network Coding and Onion Routing, but it 
combines them in a novel way, so that the resulting design is capable of providing high level 
of sender side confidentiality.
Subsequent part of the thesis presents the problem at hand being the existing scheme's lack 
of resilience against common error situations, such as failure of node software or hardware, 
network  congestion  etc.  The  importance  of  a  network  –  where  the  number  of  messages 
belonging to a single anonymous session is quadratic to the basic system parameters – being 
error prone through a well-established mechanism is demonstrated and explained through 
examples of how decoding is carried out in the present scheme.
Taking advantage of some of the mechanisms already present in the system today (such as 
Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme, XOR etc.) and of the locality of the effect of node errors, 
the thesis proposes a double-redundant coding technique that can make the system resilient 
against  communication  failure,  as  long  as  the  number  of  node  failures  is  at  most  the 
arbitrarily chosen integer  (that stands for redundancy).
Subsequently the thesis points out some of the desirable corollary of the presented coding 
technique, such as being able to withstand a complete main path failure at no additional 
costs or difficulty of decoding.  Next the thesis presents an evaluation of  the relationship 
between the strength of churn resilience and offered level of anonymity through simulations. 
During this evaluation process the thesis reconstructs the simulation method used by the 
original work and then establishes its own – wider-spectrum – attack model along which 
subsequent conclusions are drawn.
Based on the outcome of this process, the thesis points out that there is a trade-off between  
the two properties of churn resilience and anonymity and presents some guidelines along 
which the necessary level of both may be achieved.
Further along the way the work proposes an improvement over the coding-scheme initially 
presented.   The  improvement  aims  for  advancing  the  network  economical  aspect  (total 
amount of data traveling through the mesh) of the final scheme through replacing the inner-
code by a systematic Reed-Solomon Code, as an Erasure Code.
Building on the properties of the final scheme, the thesis demonstrates an easy extension of 
the newly created technique to make the network able to recover not only from errors of  
random nature  (churn),  but  also  from malicious  nodes'  purposeful  and  deliberate  action 
towards disrupting network communication, a feature referred to as Tampering Resilience.
Finally the thesis points out some aspects not discussed in the original design, such as the  
excessive combinatorial  and computational  complexity that cooperating attackers need to 
face when trying to compromise anonymity, and highlights several paths that can be taken in 
the future to further improve the advantageous properties of the newly presented scheme.
修　士　論　文　の　和　文　要　旨
研究科・専攻 大学院　　　　　　　学研究科　　　　　　　　　　　専攻　博士前期課程
UEC IS/NS 情報システム学研究科 情報ネットワーク  専攻　博士前期課程
氏　　　　名 Huszák Gergely György
フサーク　ゲルゲイ
学籍番号
1052034
論 文 題 目
Churn and Tampering Resilience in 
Network Coding-based Anonymous P2P Network
ネットワーク符号化に基づく匿名 P2P ネットワークの Churn と Tampering 耐性
  要　　旨
論文は，既存のネットワーク符号化法に基づく匿名 P2P ネットワークに，Churn 耐
性ならびに耐タンパ性をもたらす拡張法について論じる．
　まず最初に，Wang らによって提案された匿名性 P2P ネットワークについて，計
算効率と匿名性の強さの観点から紹介する．
　Wang らのシステムは，すでによく知られたネットワーク符号化とオニオン・ル
ーティングを新しく組み合わせることによって，送信側における高いレベルの匿名
性を可能にしている．
 次に，Wang らの匿名性 P2P システムでは，ソフトあるいはハードの故障やネット
ワークの輻輳といった，ネットワーク上ではよく起こりうる誤りに対する耐性が欠
けるという問題点を指摘する．
　彼らのシステムでは，一つの匿名セッションで送信されるメッセージ数はシステ
ムの基本パラメータの２次オーダになるため，送信誤りが発生しやすい傾向にある
ことを明らかにし，さらに，いくつかの例を用いて，どのようにメッセージが復号
されるかについても説明する．
　本論文では，Wang らの匿名性 P2P システムの中で用いられている，いくつかの
手法，例えば，しきい値秘密分散法や XOR 演算など，ならびに，ノード障害は局所
的にしか影響を及ぼさないことを利用して，新たに，ノード障害に対する耐性を匿
名 P2P ネットワークにもたらす二重符号化法を提案する．
　そして，提案符号化法では，新たにコストを増やすことなく，また容易に，ノー
ド障害に対する耐性を実現できることを示す．
　さらに，本論文では，組合せ論に基づく理論的な手法と，シミュレーションに基
づく実践的な手法を用いて，Churn 耐性の強さと匿名性レベルとの関係について吟
味する．
　これらの関係を調べるため，本論文では，Wang らの論文で示されているシミュ
レーション結果を追試した上で，より汎用的な，ネットワークの攻撃モデルを新た
に確立する．
　これらの結果より，本論文では，Churn 耐性と匿名性には二律背反の関係がある
ことを示し，さらに，両者を満足いくレベルに保つためのガイドラインを与える．
　さらに，提案する二重符号化法をより改良するための方法についても考察する．
　二重符号化で用いる内符号をリード・ソロモン符号を用いて，シンボル消失誤り
訂正を行うことによって，最終的なシステムのネットワーク効率を促進する．
　提案システムの特性を活かすことにより，本論文では，提案システムを，悪意を
もったノードがネットワーク通信を途絶させることを意図した攻撃からネットワー
クを復旧できる，いわゆる，耐タンパ性をもつシステムへ，容易に拡張できること
を示す．
　最後に，本論文では，最初の設計では検討されていなかったいくつかの観点，た
とえば，複数の攻撃者が協同して匿名性を暴くために必要な計算量などを指摘し，
提案手法の利点をさらに改良するいくつかの方策を提示する．
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1 List of Special Notations
Lower case italic letters: Scalars
Capital cursive letters: Scalars
Italic letters with tilde: Code parameters
Capital italic letters: Nodes
Bold letters: Vectors (binary or symbolic)
Upper index in parentheses: Stage index
Dotted index: Abbreviation for enumeration 
Example is equivalent to 
May be used along with other notations, e.g. 
Bold letters with hat: Estimators
Two vertical bars: Concatenation (of vectors)
Concatenation sign with 2 indices: Iterative 
concatenation of vectors
Example is equivalent to 
Circle with an equally sized plus sign in it: Binary 
bit-wise XOR operation between equally sized 
vectors  and 
XOR sign with indices: Iterative XOR of equally 
sized vectors
Example is equivalent to 
If and only if (necessary and sufficient condition)
Small dot: Scalar multiplication ( )
Sets collecting problems or other sets with the same
complexity or cardinality  (respectively)
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2 List of Abbreviations
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AC-ITCN Anonymous Communication via 
Information Transmission based on Network Coding
AP2P(C/N) Anonymous Peer-to-Peer (Communication/Network)
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EC Erasure Code
ECC Error Correcting Code
ES Existing Scheme [2]
HF Hashing Function
IT Information Theory
MDS(C) Maximum Distance Separable (Code)
MT Master's Thesis
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NM Network Message
P2P Peer-to-Peer
P2PC Peer-to-Peer Communication
P2PN Peer-to-Peer Network
PS Proposed Scheme
RI Routing Information 
RSC Reed-Solomon Code
RSSS Ramp Secret Sharing Scheme
RV Random Vector
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SSSS Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme 
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TSSS Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme
XOR Exclusive Or
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4 Introduction
4.1 Background
The last decades have witnessed considerable development in the fields of  Peer-to-
Peer Communication  (P2PC) and  Networks (P2PN)  [13]. The primary target of 
such solutions is to offer information sharing services between peers without the need 
for any special  – e.g. centralized – entities.  Most typically this  is  achieved by the 
members of the network themselves offering relaying services to each other: a node 
may be an endpoint in one and then act as a network element in an other session. The 
term peer comes from the fact that participating nodes have equal rights and roles in 
the network.
One of the most notable advantage of such systems is robustness: both node fail-
ures and attacker's actions have limited influence on the overall system's availability. 
One of the most notable item on the flip side of the coin is the difficulty of guarantee-
ing minimum level and quality of service, as there usually is a big diversity between 
the capabilities of the peers and in a purely P2P system none of the entities can influ-
ence the participating node beyond the possibilities provided by the underlying mech-
anisms and protocols equally available for each participant. 
Anonymous Peer-to-Peer Communication (AP2PC) is  built  on the concept of 
P2PC, while stepping beyond it by providing mechanisms to hide the true identities 
of the sender, the receiver or both of a given session. Starting from the initial solutions 
(Anonymizer  [3], Napster  [9] etc.) the evolution of the anonymous solutions has 
been steady and provided several working solution (Chaumian networks [17], Onion 
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Routing  [4], Tor  [16], Tarzan  [15], Crowds  [6] etc.) previously and currently 
being available publicly.
An  Anonymous Peer-to-Peer Network (AP2PN) may be categorized from mul-
tiple perspectives, such as:
1. Direction of communication  :
◦ One-way: Similar to the traditional simplex communication
◦ Two-way: Using the above analogy, this works as a duplex channel. 
The actual communication taking place between the endpoints is up to 
the higher layers: may be send/acknowledge- or request/response-type
2. Scope of anonymity:   This may be sender-, receiver- or mutual-anonymity.
3. Minimum features required   to be possessed by an attacker to gain information 
and/or control:
1. Impersonating relay nodes may be sufficient
2. Need to be able to snoop on all lines of the network
AP2PN may provide additional features, such as search- or query-services, or those 
might be outside of the scope of the anonymous part of the system (e.g. may be web-
based or centralized etc.)
One of the recent works of Wang et al. [2] has proposed a novel technique to es-
tablish one-way sender-anonymity that – they claim – provides elevated level of an-
onymity (increased robustness against attacker) compared to  other existing solutions 
[14].  That work demonstrates a construction technique that relies on lightweight 
Network  Coding (NC)  [10][11] scheme to  realize  anonymous  data  flow from 
sender  to final destination .
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4.2 Problem Description
While the proposed scheme [2] does seem to advantages over earlier solutions for 
the same problem, it does does not seem to address the topic of churn resilience. In 
certain systems this  shall  not  be a  concern,  but  due to  the  fact  that  the proposed 
scheme possesses the following properties, we believe it is imperative to explicitly 
deal with churn and related issues:
1. The communication is  uni-directional: acknowledgement-based resending is 
not possible
2. Number of nodes participating in a transfer is large ( ) and the mes-
sages sent between them is even larger ( )
3. Each and every node and the messages sent by them is absolutely necessary 
to provide successful transfer from  to 
4.3 Overview of Content
This Maser's Thesis (MT) will address the following items:
1. Detailed explanation of the Existing Anonymous Communication via 
Information Transmission based on Network Coding (AT-ITCN) Scheme (ES) 
[2] and demonstration of its weakness
2. Presentation of our proposed solution that implements  Churn Resilience 
(CR) and detailed explanation of its mechanisms
3. Discussion of the network-economy aspects of such a system and proposing 
improvements for it using an ideal Erasure Codes (EC)
4. Demonstration of a construction technique that makes and actual  Reed-So-
lomon Code (RSC) – used as an EC – suitable for our scheme
5. Discussion of the relationship between CR and anonymity via simulations
6. Comparison of our results to that of the original paper [2]
7. Possibility of using our newly established scheme to implement  Tampering 
Resilience (TR)
8. Final conclusions on our proposed scheme
6
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9. Discussion of topics, such as what other improvements of the original design 
may be possible through further researc
5 The Existing Scheme
5.1 Introduction
The  ES  achieves  one-way AC from sender   to  final  destination   through  the 
following 4 steps carried out by :
1.  selects  relay nodes 
2. It sets up  mesh networks to be able to reach each  anonymously
3.  sends routing information (RI) (also referred to as Path Setup Information) 
to each  using these pre-constructed meshes
4. Finally it sends the actual secret via  to  using traditional Onion Rout-
ing (OR) [4]
Step 3. is  highlighted because this is the step where most of the novelty  of our 
work lies. As explained above, our network is two-fold and Fig. 1 shows the complete 
network, with the outer-layer at the top and the inner-layers at the bottom.
From among the 4 steps listed above, step 1. is represented by the intermediate OR 
relay nodes  ,  step 2.  manifests  itself  through the network clouds (this  is  the in-
7
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ner-layer of our network), step 3. is represented by the gray lines (ending in bigger ar-
rows) and finally step 4. is shown by the black lines (having smaller arrows).
Up till now we have talked about exclusively the outer-layer of our network, which 
relies on traditional techniques known from OR, while the inner-layer holds most of 
the features the ES is notable for. At step 2.  has to share some information with each 
 so that during the OR-phase, these relays can properly route the secret. The details 
of this information is not discussed, but – due to the fact that the paper [2] explicitly 
mentions traditional onion routing [4] – we assume that RI includes network (Layer 
3) addresses of the next relay node along with one-time symmetric encryption keys to 
make those able to “peel-off” one layer of the onion.
5.2 Distribution Technique for RI
The way this (step 3. in chapter 5.1) is achieved is through the following means:
1.  uses a coding technique to divide the RI (from here referred to as ) into  
equally sized slices ( ) – in a way that only possessing all slices allows 
anyone to decode  – and generates random vectors (RVs)  matching 
in size for each slice 
2. Using  exclusive or  (XOR) operation between vector pairs of   and    
forms vectors , and by rearranging each  in a predictable fashion cre-
ates vectors 
3. Through a mesh of  prearranged nodes , all vector pairs of  
and   are sent  along   disjoint  paths  (referred to  also as  main path or 
branch from now on) in the form of network messages (NMs)
4. Each intermediate node  of a given stage  (from now on also referred 
to as column) and branch  of the mesh:
1. receives  input  messages ,   and   from all  the 
nodes in the previous stage , except for the first stage nodes , 
which receives only  and   from 
8
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2. generates a RV  matching the received  and  in size
3. creates outgoing messages  (by applying  to   via XOR) 
and   (using  XOR  between   and  the  concatenation  of 
)
4. creates outgoing messages  by slicing the locally generated  
into  disjoint and equally sized pieces so that 
5. sends   and   horizontally and   pieces of   diagonally, 
except for the last stage ( ) that sends all its outgoing messages to 
5. Finally  receives all the pieces sent by the stage  nodes and first recovers 
 by executing a sequence of XOR operations and then   (the RI) via 
the inverse operation of the original coding scheme
As visible, in this scheme:
– only nodes of the first stage know 
– and only the last stage knows 
– none of the nodes know both ( )
– only  is able to do the decoding
9
Fig. 2: Message flows of the inner-layer
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These for features together guarantee the anonymity and confidentiality of the in-
ner-, while OR will provide the same for the outer-layer. Fig. 2 provides details on all 
the entities present in, and messages flowing within the inner layer.
Note: within this MT we consider a RV to be an independent, equiprobable and 
memoriless binary string (in other words “flow of bits”), so that knowing some part 
of  it  leaves  the  rest  completely undetermined.  In the  Information  Theoretical (IT) 
sense this means that the mutual information between any parts of such RV is 0.
5.3 Operations Within the Inner-layer
In this chapter we will demonstrate the very details of all the important operations 
done and entities present in the inner layer of the original solution. Fig. 3 serves the 
purpose of doing this with the freely chosen parameters of  and . Please 
note that in the original design [2] the demonstration of the mechanisms is done with 
the parameters  , but – to provide ease of understanding and due to space 
constraints within the document – we present a smaller network. However it is im-
portant to emphasize that the scheme operates the same way, independently from these 
parameters (as long as ).
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All the nodes what were represented by circles in Fig. 2 are now “zoomed” and be-
come rectangular areas. Left and right sides represent sender   and receiver   (re-
spectively), while the middle shows each relay node   of the interjected mesh. 
Each relay node is divided into 3 sections, showing the messages the node receives 
(labelled by “input”), it generates by itself (“generated locally”) and – after executing 
NC –  sends (“output”) to the next stage. Binary vectors are represented by boxes. 
Among these boxes those that are grey-scale stands for actual user data hiding  , 
while coloured carets represent RVs. A given stacking of these boxes also represents a 
single binary vector, which is formed by “moulding” the original vectors together us-
ing (a series) XOR operation(s).
By looking at Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 one can see all the details of the coding and mes-
sage flow that takes place in the mesh, but let us summarize it through the example of 
the node . This node will receive the slice  { } of the secret (XORed by 
RVs) and the stacked RV  { } from  (travelling via the same branch hori-
zontally) and  pieces of  { , } (travelling diagonally). At this moment 
 will generate its local RV  { }, XOR it to , forming  { }. 
In addition it  will  also sequentially  concatenate the received vectors   and 
XOR the resulting vector to , forming  { }. In the final coding step  is 
to slice its locally generated RV  into  disjoint pieces, forming  { , }. 
The role of  ends by sending ,  and the  pieces of  to stage 3.
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The duties of the first and the last stages are slightly simpler, as diagonal receiving 
and sending (respectively) does not take place.
The receiving node  will first decode each slice  through  XOR operations 
done among the vectors indicated by Fig. 3 (XOR operation  between vector parts 
marked by ). The XOR operations can take place in any order due to the following 
facts:
– XOR is commutative (as over the binary field it is equivalent to addition)
–  for any binary vectors  and 
After having the vectors  in hand,  can decode the original secret , which 
hides the RI used by the outer-layer, which altogether requires  to XOR opera-
tions at .
5.4 Churn Resilience and Failure Model
As deducible from the above explanations and visible from the proof in section III. 
of the paper [2] decoding of RI by any  is always possible as long as it receives 
each an every message sent by the last stage ( ) unaltered. The pre-requisite of this 
is that all previous stages perform likewise. While error-free delivery of messages be-
tween stages can be guarantied by using connection oriented point-to-point services 
and/or integrity check and acknowledgment at the  transport layer, these techniques 
can not protect against message loss due to node failure.
Herein we would like to define the failure model we will subsequently build upon: 
by churn, we mean the situation, when a node fails to perform any of its duties (re-
ceiving, RV generations, coding, forwarding):
• due to software or hardware failure
• because it leaves the P2P network in a controlled or uncontrolled fashion
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• due to any network congestion or failure that prevents it to accept or make 
connections and to receive or send any/all of the messages due in the normal 
course of events
Because the system includes redundancy neither in the inner- nor in the outer-layer, 
any failure will result in the loss or corruption of at least one of the messages and – 
because of the fact that all messages are required for a successful decoding – in failure 
of some of the intended OR relays to acquire RI. As a direct consequence the commu-
nication between  and  becomes completely impossible.
Moreover both the inner- and the outer-layer communication are uni-directional,  
will have no notion of the subsequent events and possible failures, therefore it can not 
take countermeasures in the form of trying to replace failed nodes or resending all 
retrying the communication entirely.
It is also important to emphasize that the number of nodes taking place in the com-
munication is over  and the messages traveling between those is .
As a conclusion, while offering advantages in the field of anonymity and com-
putational complexity, the original system completely unprotected against node 
failures that are inherent to (unavoidable in) any P2P network.
6 Proposed Solution
Our proposed solution is based on the following two criteria: We will 
– use (source) coding techniques
– rely on the existing mechanisms of the ES as much as possible
to achieve resilience against churn.
It is also obvious that in a typical OR system the number of real nodes is fixed to 
be low (typically ), but in the ES the number of nodes necessary to reach these 
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onion routers is quadratic, therefore the churn resilience has to target the inner-layer. If 
the high value of expected probability of node failure requires it, the sender   does 
have simple techniques (such as  alternative OR path construction,  hop-by-hop ac-
knowledgment etc.) to to guaranty minimum reliability of the outer-layer as well. As 
the complexity of the problem lying in the inner-layer is considerably higher, we will 
focus on that and will not further discuss the details of the methods available for the 
outer-layer. 
6.1 Naïve Approach
In this chapter we would like to present the most obvious solution to the problem 
and point out why – due to the design features of the ES – that would not be suitable 
to establish churn resilience. Such obvious approach is the following:
1. Increase the number of branches from  to , where   is chosen 
according to the probability of expected node failure or in other words the esti-
mated or measured real-time reliability of the network
2. Use a coding scheme that can generate  slices  out of  in a fashion 
that receiving at least  of those would always allow decoding, but receiv-
ing less then  would never do so
3. Select   nodes for the inner-layer and send each   along   disjoint 
main paths (branches)
6.1.1 Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes
We need to find a Secret Sharing Scheme (SSS) that satisfies the requirements of 
point 2. in chapter  6.1. The first part of the statement (“receiving at least”) comes 
from the fact that we proportioned our scheme to tolerate  node failures, therefore we 
expect the new scheme to always be able to decode, as long as the number of node 
failures is at most  . The second part of our requirements (“receiving less than”) is a 
constraint that we must explicitly inherit from the ES.
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Coding schemes satisfying this very requirements do exist and form the category of 
Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes (TSSS). One of the most notable of the actual 
construction techniques belonging to this family is Shamir's Secret Scheme (SSSS) 
[1]. Its features can be summarized by the following sentence: it allows arbitrary se-
cret  be encoded by  shares in a way that receiving any  ( ) of those 
completely determines , while receiving less than  leaves  completely undeter-
mined. In the IT interpretation we can rephrase this by saying that in case of such a 
 TSSS when one receives  shares only the following two possibilities exist:
–   then , where  stands for entropy
– otherwise 
In such scheme we call  the threshold and it satisfies the criteria of perfectness.
It is not stated explicitly by the ES [2], but by their requirements against the cod-
ing technique that produces  vectors from , we make the assumption that they 
build on an unspecified  TSSS. Construction of such a scheme is very simple. 
An example may be the following:
1. Generate  RV of equal size (that of ), forming 
2. XOR each of these to , forming 
Such construction is  computationally lightweight (from the perspective of both, 
the coding and decoding steps) and its  necessary and sufficient conditions are the 
reception of all  slices.
For the cases when , the construction is much less obvious and has drawn 
considerable research attention.  Currently existing solution  range from polynomial 
oversampling (proposed by Shamir himself and requiring expensive operations, such 
as Lagrange interpolation [1]) to some schemes of late relying only on computa-
tionally lightweight operations (such as XOR [8][12]).
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As more detailed discussion of the SSS is outside of the scope of this MT, therefore 
we will purely rely on the assumptions that such scheme exists and is computationally 
feasible. For the sake of later analysis, we emphasize that TSSS is a perfect (which 
implies ) SSS and we assume it to be ideal (which means ) re-
sulting in the size of each share being equal to that of the secret ( ).
6.1.2 Single-redundant Coding
Let us discuss the details of how the coding explained in chapter 6.1.1 would oper-
ate and point out its weakness, that calls for additional measures. Fig. 4 compares the 
slicing technique utilized by the ES and the method described under 6.1.1 (upper) in 
case of the parameters of  and  (lower). From now on we will not use a 
different notation for   and   as those are in fact same with regards to their size 
( ) and content: slices that encode , totally hide/give full access to 
its original content when certain conditions are not met/not met (respectively).
From  the  network's  structure's  perspective,  applying  the  extended  scheme 
(2,3) TSSS will do nothing more than creating an additional branch in the network, 
in a way that if  receives and can decode any 2 of the 3 slices (  and  or  
and  or  and ), then he can also recover , while receiving less than 2 (
 or  or  or none of them) will leave him in the same situation as in case of the  
ES. Needless to say that an attacker – trying to compromise the network – has the 
same objective, which is trying to receive least 2 of the 3 slices.
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Fig. 4: Single-redundant coding with (bottom) and without (top) redundancy
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Fig. 5 demonstrates how such an extension of the ES would look in practice, in-
cluding highlighting the decoding steps for  . As visible the scheme works as be-
fore, except for the number of pieces the generated RVs are cut into.
Now – through an example – let us see how the system reacts to churn.  Fig. 6 
shows the case when node  fails to meet its duties. Let us linger a bit around the 
details of the figure. The grey area represents the node that fails, including the case 
when any of its messages fails to get delivered unaltered. Messages (vectors) covered 
by black carets are the ones that are lost in the worst case, as a direct result of node 
failure (churn). What we expect is that decoding would still be possible, as :
– did use (2,3) TSSS to create each  vector
– and it did receive 2 of those (  and ) unaltered
17
Fig. 5: Single-redundancy: decoding
6. Proposed Solution
18
Fig. 6: Single-redundancy: failure in branch one
Fig. 7: Single-redundancy: vectors affected by churn (branch 1)
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Unfortunately the  above  mentioned  assumption  is  incorrect,  due  to  the  special 
nature of the ES. More precisely, due to the fact that RVs used during the encoding – 
and therefore necessary for the decoding – of an  travelled diagonally and accumu-
lated in all  branches of the network. Fig. 7 points out those RVs that become lost 
due to the failure of , that would be necessary for decoding the slices travelling 
via otherwise unaffected branched (  and  ). These RVs are marked by yellow 
carets { }, while the affected parts of the slices are highlighted by yellow rectangles 
{ }.
Quick summary: as visible, while  did receive 2 slices, it will be unable to de-
code those, due to the fact that part of the RVs necessary to do so are also lost.
Using the same notations, et us quickly demonstrate the cases when failure occurs 
in other branches (and stages). Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the cases when nodes  and 
 (respectively). Fig. 5 is available for reference for the invisible vectors.
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Fig. 8: Single-redundancy: vectors affected by churn (branch 2)
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Conclusion: as visible through the demonstrated examples, a failure in branch , 
will cause not only the loss of vector , but also decoding failure in the  part all 
other slices travelling through the remaining branches.
Because  of  this  phenomenon inherent  to  the  design,  a  single-redundant  coding 
would not be sufficient to counter node failure (churn).
6.2 Double-redundant Coding
6.2.1 Encoding
Our final proposal builds on the naïve approach, while stepping beyond it. The fea-
ture that we take advantage is the following phenomenon deducible from the construc-
tion of the ES: in case of failure of  relay nodes, at most  disjoint parts (each  in 
size) of all the  vectors become un-decodable via XOR in the remaining branches.
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Fig. 9: Single-redundancy: vectors affected by churn (branch 3)
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Based on this observation we introduce redundancy also to the slices already en-
coded using TSSS by re-applying the same scheme again, with the same parameters. 
Fig. 10 shows how this is achieved in case of .
The operation necessary to achieve properly encoded slices is as follows:
1. Based on the ES (that provides the parameters  and , as shown in Fig. 2 and 
Fig. 3), choose the level of churn resilience required under the present condi-
tions. Let us call this value  (stands for redundancy)
2. Encode  using ( , ) TSSS (where ) into  intermediate 
slices  (let us refer to this as first stage coding).
3. Encode each  into  subsequent slices
4. Concatenate the resulting vectors that were generated from the same interme-
diate slice , resulting in  vectors (let's use the tern second stage cod-
ing for these last two steps)
5. The rest goes according to the technique presented in chapter  5.2, bearing in 
mind the updated network parameters (  and ).
We would like to point out that – using this scheme – the second stage will cause 
linear size increment of all the  vectors, compared to the ES. Because of this, all 
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Fig. 10: Proposed solution using double-redundancy
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relevant messages ( ,  ,   and  ) will also increase in 
size according to the same multiplier.
Important notes: For the case of simplicity and to conserve space, from this point 
on we will refer to 
– figures Fig. 6 - Fig. 9 in the context of the Proposed Scheme (PS) described 
herein (chapter  6.2). This is possible, because from that perspective the PS 
looks and – in between the encoding and decoding steps (exclusive) – acts like 
single-redundant solution, except for the size increment mentioned in the pre-
vious paragraph. In other words the nodes of the mesh or not aware of the de-
tails of the coding scheme utilized by 
–  as . In other words it also holds that , which is analogous to 
the naming used in conjunction with the TSSSs
6.2.2 Decoding in General
Upon receiving the messages,  will be able to acquire  as long as the number of 
node failures does not exceed  using the following algorithm, including the execution 
of the inverse of the encoding operations in reverse order:
1. Locate node any possible node failure by looking at all the received vectors 
from among  and  and locate the node failure(s) in the form of , 
 …  (where  is the branch-id where failure occurred)
2. Make sure that 
3. Discard the ,  …    of each received  and  vectors
4. Decode the remaining parts of the received  and  vectors via the usual 
means (by applying XOR operation)
5. Apply the  inverse  operation (decoding  step)  of  ( ,  )  TSSS  used  at 
second stage of the encoding step to obtain any  pieces of  vectors
6. Feed these to the inverse operation of ( , ) TSSS used at first stage of the 
encoding step to obtain vector  (RI)
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6.2.3 Decoding Example
Let  us  make a  close  demonstration  of  the  decoding scheme through the  example 
presented in  Fig. 8. As visible, in that situation   is affected by churn, therefore 
vectors  and  will not be received. Moreover the 2nd 1/3rd of  and  be-
come impossible to decode. The decoding of  in this situation will be as shown and 
explained herein:
1. Identify the failed branch and discard relevant parts of otherwise received vec-
tors, marked by red crosses { }: left side
2. Carry out the XOR operations and execute the inverse operation of the second 
stage (2, 3) TSSS: right side
3. Using the resulting temporary vectors, execute the inverse of the first stage 
(2, 3) TSSS, providing : bottom
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6.2.4 An Interesting Phenomenon
Careful reading of the decoding algorithm explained in chapter 6.2.2 reveals an in-
teresting – and advantageous –  property of this scheme which can be phrased the fol-
lowing way: a failure of a node  will render   of all the received  
and  vectors unusable (undecodable via XOR), therefore any other node failure 
within the same branch   will not further degrade the decoding performance. 
This can be summarized into a theorem describing the properties of our scheme.
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Fig. 11: Double-redundancy: decoding
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Theorem: Message  can be recovered as long as the number of branches where 
any churn is present is at most .
Based on our earlier examples  Fig. 12 demonstrates a case when a whole branch 
fails ( ,  and ), decoding is still possible using the algorithm described un-
der chapter  6.2.2, simply because additional node failure in the same branch affects 
vectors that – due to earlier failures – are either already corrupted or anyway would 
not be necessary for (would be discarded by) the decoding process.
6.2.5 Non-atomic Node Failure
In chapter 5.4 we assumed churn to be an atomic event, in the sense that either all 
messages of a node are lost or none of them are. The decoding scheme has also built 
on this assumption. While it is true that this is the simplest case, it is easy to extend 
the PS to partial node failure.
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Fig. 12: Double-redundancy: recovery from branch failure
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Such failure may occur when a node is fully functional and performs its tasks cor-
rectly, but – for example due to limited network connectivity – it fails to reach some 
(even one) of its correspondents. Please recall the discussion of chapter 5.4 that said a 
loss of any of the transmitted vectors will result in an utter failure of decoding of RI.
Limited – or selective lack of – connectivity are known phenomena and should be 
addressed. Both of the following two methods shall be sufficient to address this scen-
ario:
1. Encode  presence  information  into  all  the   or   vectors,  indicating 
which of the random vectors  have been received and used dur-
ing the encoding.  Using this  technique,   can identify the failed  branches 
(please see chapter 6.2.4 for more details on this) by enumerating the source  
nodes  that  –  under  normal  circumstances  –  would  have  sent  the  missing 
pieces. For example if everything has been received and used for encoding, ex-
cept for the pieces:
◦ Failures in the same branch: If  and  are missing, then make 
sure  that   and  proceed  with  the  decoding  while  considering 
branch 2 to have failed
◦ Failures  in  different  branches:  If   and   are  missing,  then 
make sure that  and decoding under the assumption that branches 
2 and 3 have failed
2. Handle such scenario as if it was tampering and rely on the Tampering Resili-
ence (TR) technique discussed in chapter 8
Our recommendation is to follow the second approach, for at least the following 
two reasons:
– TR will anyway be present, therefore can be taken advantage of without addi-
tional design or implementation efforts
– Including additional information into the vectors also increases attacker's prac-
tical chances to compromise anonymity. Under normal conditions, the system 
can be constructed so that attackers have to execute very large number of oper-
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ations to be able to decode RI (see details on this in chapter 7.1.3). If a mali-
cious node  can make an educated guess on its location in the mesh, then the 
attackers can rule out a large amount of invalid decoding combinations, this 
way weakening the level of practical anonymity.
6.3 The Inner-layer processes Formally
To support ease of reproducibility, this chapter will give a formal definition of all 
the  inner-layer  mechanisms  described  in  the  earlier  chapters.  Please  also  refer  to 
Fig. 2. Additional information can be found in the related papers [2][5].
6.3.1 Encoding
As a preparation step,   performs two times threshold secret sharing on the mes-
sage  to be sent as follows:
1.  shares the message  into  intermediate shares  using a  
TSSS. If  then 
2.  shares each of the intermediate shares  via the same TSSS into  sub-
sequent shares, each, producing   (  are the   shares produced 
from )
3.  produces  a  message   for  ,  where 
 (where )
In  addition   forms  vectors   the  following  way:   for 
, where  are  random vectors and . Subsequently 
 divides every  into  equally sized consecutive pieces called .
Let  be the following coefficient matrix with  elements:
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In  addition  let   be  formed  the  following  way:   for 
.
Now these  messages   and   are  ready to  be transmitted  over  the   
branches of the inner layer as shown by Fig. 2.
6.3.2 Forwarding and Network Coding
Each intermediate node   (for   and  ) of the forwarding 
mesh will proceed the following way:
1. Choose random coding coefficient  to encode the input message 
 the following way: 
2. Calculate  using the input message  as follows:
1. For : 
2. Otherwise: 
3. For  ,   output messages   are created by slicing   into   
equally sized consecutive parts so that 
4. Finally:
1. For , messages  and  are forwarded to , while each 
 is sent to 
2. For the nodes of the last stage ( ) all messages ,   and  
are sent directly to  itself
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6.3.3 Decoding
As  receives all the parts that have taken part in the NC process, the decoding is  
always possible through the following steps:
1.  can construct the following matrix:
2. Each  can be computed the following way:
 for 
3. The  recovery  of   is  directly  possible  via  the  decoding  of  the  selected 
 TSSS using any  of the  vectors
6.4 The Coding Scheme of the Second Stage
Until now, we always suggested that both, the first- and the second-stage, coding 
schemes use the same type of function: a TSSS. In fact this is not completely mandat-
ory and we will shows that, if done otherwise, there can be improvements of some 
properties of the PS.
The  main  motivating  factor  behind  choosing  TSSS  has  been  explained  under 
chapter 6.1.1 in details. As visible, the only reason why TSSS has been chosen for the 
first-stage is requirement inherited from the ES, but such requirement has not been 
phrased against the properties of the   vectors. In practice, this means that we 
have the freedom of replacing the coding scheme used by the second-stage, as long as 
the new code holds the following property: the chosen coding scheme must be able 
to successfully decode each  as long as at most  of those become un-decod-
able via XOR due to loss of relevant RVs.
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During our research we have evaluated multiple coding schemes to find out which 
suits our requirements the best. One branch of this research has aimed at using Foun-
tain Codes as second-stage code – as for example Raptor Codes offer advantageous 
properties, such as linear time complexity – but we found that the following property 
of those make them inappropriate for our case: even receiving   slices would not 
provide , where  stands for the probability of successful decoding.
Finally we settled on the family of erasure codes, that would provide exactly what 
we are looking for:
1. Guaranteed decodability as soon as the fixed threshold of received fraction 
of the original message arrives
2. No assumption on the way entropy behaves while under this threshold
The answer to the reasonable question that asks why we would further research a 
topic that already has a reasonable solution (discussed in chapter  6.2.1) lies in the 
realms of efficiency and network economy.
6.4.1 Size Expansion, Network Economy
As explained earlier, recursively applying a TSSS will cause size-expansion that is 
quadratic for each inner-layer. While it is true that the subsequent coding schemes 
may rely on computationally very efficient operations (XOR), in some environments 
the size of the messages travelling over the network might still be an issue, mainly be-
cause their number lies in  or in  (depending on whether we consider  to 
be constant or not).
Due to the constraints explained above, the only place where we can achieve more 
relaxed growth is the second-stage code. If we use something more economic than 
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TSSS as second-stage code, then we can achieve sub-quadratic (our target is linear) 
size-growth.
Let us turn our focus to the second stage now. It is easy to see that under no condi-
tion will we able to find a scheme that – for every possible input – can achieve a 
growth rate better (lower) than  (where  is size of the encoder's input and 
 stands for the size of redundancy added by the encoder). This is because if were to 
achieve an expansion rate lower than this, that would imply that  to 
be true for every possible  which is a contradiction (following the pigeonhole prin-
ciple and the fact that there must a bijection between the inputs and the outputs of 
the coding scheme).
Fig. 13 shows the amount of data that travels through the network in case TSSS is 
applied twice, instead of using a – yet imaginary, but – optimal scheme. The graph 
values represent the mount of bytes that needed to be sent, under the assumption that 
RI consists of 1 byte and .
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Fig. 13: Proportional amount of data sent for RI (r=2)
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The actual format of the RI has not been defined by the original design [2], but 
for the example it was 100 bytes, double-TSSS solution would send over 20 Mbytes, 
while an optimal approach would manage to do the same with under 2 Mbytes in a 
network with the parameters .
6.4.2 Reed-Solomon Code
In chapter 6.4.1 we have shown that the best error correcting scheme we can find 
may provide the expansion rate of , so in this chapter we attempt to find a 
scheme as close to this limit as possible. In addition to trying to solve this problem, 
we will also propose to use a specific type of code construction to support ease on the 
decoder's side. In this chapter we would like to demonstrate a practical solution for us-
ing an EC that can provide the advantages described in chapter 6.4.1. The actual EC 
we choose is a special class of the Error Correcting Codes (ECC) called Reed-So-
lomon Code (RSC).
RSC is a  Maximum Distance Separable  (MDS)  linear code, which – in other 
words – means that – during the encoding – the addition of each redundant symbol 
successfully increases the code distance. An  RSC transmits  source symbols 
in  the form of   channel  symbols.  As it  is  a Maximum Distance Separable Code 
(MDSC) it has the capability of correcting  symbol changes and  symbol 
erasures, where . Our interest lies in the code's erasure recovery capab-
ilities.
An additional property we can take advantage of is the systematic construction of 
some RSC. By systematic we mean the fact that the output of the encoder will include 
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its input at a specific location. For example if we use a prefix code the vector  will 
take the form of , where  stands for the vector of redundant symbols created 
by the encoder. It is not absolutely necessary for the code to be systematic, but makes 
the decoder's life much easier and more efficient in the general case, as – if the system 
has not been burdened by node failures, then – the decoding consists of only stripping 
off of .
Let us look at an example of how RSC may be used to provide the required erasure 
resilience through the popular   systematic RSC (  thus symbols  are 
bytes) also used by NASA that also has FPGA-based implementations. According to 
the earlier explanation, this code will be able to encode a 223-byte long  vector into 
a 255 byte long  vector in a way that – if the location of the erasures is known to the 
receiver – decoding of  will be possible as long as the number of bytes lost does not 
exceed . As  stands for the vector that is the output of the first stage encoder 
(TSSS) and the input of its decoder, recovering  is the condition of being able to re-
cover the RI represented by .
We need to exploit one more technique often used with this code construction, to 
be able to directly use this  to provide arbitrary erasure-resilience properties. 
This property is called code shortening and it refers to the following idea: in case the 
number of symbols to be encoded  is less than  (223 in this case) it is possible 
to proceed the following way to be able to be able to take advantage of the chosen 
coding scheme:
1. Pad  with  zeroes, resulting in  being  byte long
2. Encode  using the chosen  RSC outputting , where 
3. Remove the  zeros from  (which is easily possible, as we chose a sys-
tematic scheme) and use the resulting  vector for channel input
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Please note that – because we choose a systematic code –  will effectively be a 
concatenation of  and vector of parity check symbols. Receiver can do the decod-
ing the following way:
1. If receiver detects no erasures then assume  is  (stripped off of the parity 
check symbols) and do the decoding step of the outer-code as usual
2. Otherwise reinsert  zeroes to  and do the RSC decoding step of the in-
ner-code providing  (right after the added zero symbols are removed)
If put into the perspective of the inner-code of our network, then the advantage of 
this approach is that both  and  can use a fixed RSC scheme, independently from 
the actual network parameters ,  and  chosen by the network designer.
To be able to use this scheme directly in our case, we have to make one more step. 
The reason for this is the fact that we have a varying set of pairs of network paramet-
ers , , while the scheme we choose has the fixed values of ,  and 
. Let us see a concrete example of how this goes in case the size of  is , 
 and .
Because in case of the chosen RSC scheme  we have to proceed the follow-
ing way with the encoding:
1. Slice  into   disjunct  pieces  ,  the  size  of  which  would  be 
 bytes, each (where obviously )
2. Pad each  with  zero bytes, resulting in  vectors, each 
 byte in size
3. Apply the chosen RSC encoding scheme onto each  vectors resulting in 
 vectors, each  bytes in size
4. Remove  zeroes from the   vectors 
(this is easily possible, because we chose a systematic RSC), yielding   
vectors, each  bytes in size
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5. Slice all  vector into  disjunct pieces of , each  bytes 
in size, where all last slice  are vectors of of parity check bytes
6. Create channel input as a concatenation of the  pieces of these slices as 
follows: , being  byte total
Fig. 14 shows how this works in practice.
Due to the earlier explained properties of our scheme, if the number of inner-net-
work branches affected by churn is  , the decoding of exactly   of the consecutive 
 byte  long  parts  of  the   vector  (more  precisely   pieces  of 
).
Fig. 15 demonstrates the complete inner-layer encoding in case RSC is used. This 
figure scales with Fig. 10, in the sense that these show the resulting vectors and their 
relative sizes in a network that has the same parameters.
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Because in case of our scheme , one of these pieces may be affected by churn 
without loosing the capability of overall decoding of any of the  vectors. Let us see 
how decoding works in case branch 2 manifests error. In case  becomes un-
decodable via XOR, but  may still decode each  the following way:
1. Slice  into  vectors of 
2. Build vectors  from these pieces, while bearing in mind that the 2nd part 
of each has been erased (in the sense that those can not be decoded via XOR 
operations)
3. Add the removed zero vectors back to each  providing 
4. Use the decoding scheme of RSC, yielding 
5. Remove the zeroes, providing the  vectors
6. Recover 
Fig. 16 shows how this is done in practice.
Of course if no churn occurs, the decoding is much easier, as we used a systematic 
RSC, so simple rearrangement of   (and omission of the   pieces of parity 
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Fig. 15: (255, 223) RSC: complete encoding process
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check bytes) will provide , so the decoding of the first-stage can be carried out dir-
ectly. This can also be seen easily in Fig. 16.
Please note that in this example we managed to reach the rate of , because 
we assumed the size of each  to be divisible by . If real life message sizes do 
not meet this criterion, padding each  with random data can still provide rate ex-
pansions close to the ideal value.
Please note that the choice of RSC code parameters of   is just an ex-
ample.  We chose this  simply because it  has been well  researched and referred to, 
therefore actual implementations of the necessary algorithms is widely available. See 
also the chapter Error: Reference source not found for further comments on this.
The last figure (Fig. 17) of this section shows both stages of the decoding scheme 
of the inner-layer with the parameters used in this chapter and under the assumption 
some/all nodes fail in the second branch.
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Fig. 16: (255, 223) RSC: second-stage decoding
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7 Analysis of Anonymity
In this chapter we will give a detailed explanation of:
– what anonymity relies on
– how attacker may attempt to compromise it
– what the attacker's chances to do so are in the ES and in the PS
The goal is to show to correlation between anonymity and churn resilience to give 
the users guidelines on how to select network parameters to have the desired level of 
both features at the same time.
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Fig. 17: (255, 223) RSC: complete decoding process
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7.1 Attack Model
Both the paper [2] and this MT will rely on the assumption that the actual com-
munication that finally takes place between  and  (see Fig. 1) is encrypted. The de-
tails of that encryption is outside of the scope of both the ES and the PS, but it guar-
anties that an asymmetric key or one of the paired symmetric keys has previously been 
exchanged between them, so attacker may not have access to the hidden content of the 
final message.
However  the  system  relies  on  no  preliminary  knowledge  (keys)  being  shared 
between any  other  participants of the system and an attacker may attempt to com-
promise the anonymity of the sender , by gaining access to the RI, this way connect-
ing  to . Based on this, all our subsequent analysis aims at understanding the 
attacker's ways and chances to decode RI within the inner-layer.
7.1.1 Attack Model in the ES
Due to the properties of the coding scheme they use (explained in chapter 5.2) – at-
tacker  may gain  access  to  RI  by  becoming  able  to  decode  all   vectors  of  all 
branches. Let us look at how this may be achieved.
As each vector  collects RVs via XOR operations, a malicious  needs co-
operating helpers at very specific locations to be able to recode . By “very specific 
location” we mean the following rule:  a  malicious   needs   cooperating 
helpers at the following positions:
– If :  or  or 
– If :  or 
– If : only 
for 
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Theorem 2 of the paper  [2] builds on a more complicated concept, involving a 
variable called  (not related to the  we are using within this MT), but we believe that 
their interpretation of the conditions can be further simplified as described above.
Only for reference the relevant part of the paper's theorem 2 – rephrased using our 
notation and terminology – is as follows: “… The piece  can be recovered if and 
only if there exists   compromised nodes   that 
occupy   successive  position  on  branch   and  for  all  branches   
( )  there is at least one compromised node among nodes   
( ) on each branch …”
The reasons for these conditions to hold are the following:
– To decode an ,   needs to obtain access to all the RVs that have been 
stacked upon 
–  holds  part of the RVs already in the form of    and 
– Accordingly, he needs to gain access to the remaining RVs, that can be done in 
any of the following 3 different situations:
1.  is malicious: that node has  and 
2.  is malicious: this node possesses 
3.  is malicious: this node possesses . while additional informa-
tion necessary for decoding was generated by  itself (as )
Refer to Fig. 5 for a visual representation of this scenarios.
Any other node   before or after this “window of 3 nodes per branch” either 
lacks information ( ) or has a  that has gathered additional RVs via XOR op-
eration ( ). This property is inherited from the ES and is proven in that paper.
Fig. 18 shows 2 example scenarios when the malicious attacker  may and when 
it may not decode  in case .
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In the situation shown at the left side of Fig. 18, the number of malicious nodes is 
higher than on the right side, however access to  is not possible, due to the fact that 
 does not have a Cooperating Attacker (CA) among ,  and . Even if 
the network was bigger and  or subsequent nodes were malicious,  would still 
be unable to do the decoding, for the same reason.
In contrast to this, the right side of Fig. 18 shows a case when a given attacker may 
become able to decode  vector.  To decode RI, this is still not sufficient, so let us 
change our point of view and concentrate on decoding RI itself, as that would the ulti-
mate target of any attacker.
It is obvious that in this situation it is not going to be a single node that does the 
decoding of  (equivalent to the RI), but a group of CAs. The actual decoding may 
take place anywhere (inside or outside of the network), but the following condition 
needs to be met either way: there must be at least one of the cooperating malicious 
nodes in each branch that satisfies the above-mentioned criterion.
Fig. 19 and Fig. 20 will present two cases where this condition is met and therefore 
the group of attackers gains access to RI. As explained above, this is a necessary and 
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Fig. 18: Cases when m2 may (right) and may not be (left) compromised
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sufficient condition for an attacker to be able to compromise anonymity. Both figures, 
Fig. 19 and Fig. 20, show a network that has the parameters .
Fig. 19 represents the most obvious case, where attackers form a column. This is 
the situation when the number of attackers necessary to decode   is the minimum 
and this is being mentioned by the paper [2] as “ ” (cf. the ES uses  to repres-
ent the constant number of attackers present in the mesh).
A more complicated situation is shown in Fig. 20, when attackers fail to occupy a 
full  stage (column), therefore their numbers must also be bigger. As deducible, the 
minimum number of attackers necessary to decode will fall into the range of , 
depending on the locations they manage to take.
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Fig. 19: The easiest situation when M may be decoded (ES)
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As visible from the definitions, the chances ( ) of a cooperating group of attackers 
( ) to fully decode RI depends in their numbers ( ) and locations, according to the 
following rules:
– If  then 
– If  then 
– If  then 
– If  then 
7.1.2 Attack Model in the PS
As redundancy is added to the messages in the PS, attackers' chances do change 
compared to that of in the ES,  The conditions explained in chapter 7.1.1 will turn into 
the following: a malicious  needs  cooperating helpers (at the same po-
sitions that were mentioned in chapter 7.1.1) in any of the   different branches 
→ according to the construction rules, this will allow the decoding of sufficient part 
of  to be able to decode  itself.
Moreover, instead of  ,   CAs that satisfy the above mentioned conditions 
(gaining access to  pieces of  vectors) are sufficient to decode  itself.
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Fig. 20: A less obvious case when M becomes exposed (ES)
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Fig. 21 shows a case when RI may be decoded in the PS (as long as ). It is in-
teresting to note that if we compare two networks having the same parameters  and 
, then:
– if something is decodable in the PS, that does not necessarily mean that it is 
also exposed in the ES
– but if something is breakable in the ES that necessarily means that it is also de-
codable in the PS
The details of how this affects affects anonymity in each case will be discussed in 
chapter 7.2 in details, but it is important to point out that what we really want to com-
pare are not the two networks (one under the ES and the other using the PS) with the 
same parameters, but a given network that uses the ES to an other mesh that has the 
same base parameters, but higher number of branches, where the number of incre-
ment is expressed by well-known formula .
7.1.3 Cooperating Attackers
Until now we kept using the term “cooperating attacker” (CA) but we feel this 
needs a bit of clarification and some discussions. CA means that the nodes:
– themselves participate in the forwarding mesh or have full and reliable access 
to the vectors received, generated and sent by those.
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Fig. 21: A case when M becomes decodable in the PS
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– have a full notion of the scheme – including its coding algorithms and para-
meters –  and a strategy to share information between each other or store those 
at a central location for later processing.
It may easily happen that the presence of malicious nodes in the mesh is high, but 
those do not form a single network of CAs. In such situation each group belonging to-
gether  (under the criteria of cooperation)  has a chance to decode RI independently 
from the others.
An other – much less obvious – aspect of this is the difficulty of decoding.  We 
will later show that the probability of successfully decoding RI correlates with the 
level of the presence of the CAs: probabilistically, the higher the presence, the higher 
the chance of decoding via XOR. Based on this, let us assume a cooperating group of 
attackers has managed to gain high presence in a pool of nodes. In this case:
– Malicious nodes will participate in large amount of the outer- and inner-layers 
formed
– The number of messages travelling for each  transfer is cubic or quad-
ratic
– The messages received by the group is therefore very large
– It is easy to construct a scheme, where the actual index  of the vectors  is 
not directly readable, unless decoding of  is done. This may slightly com-
plicate the decoding algorithm at each  , but – due to the small number of 
messages each of those receives – the complexity is bounded
– Each sender node of the outer- and the inner-layer knows only the identity/ies 
– network address(es) – of its successor(s) (and vice versa), but not the nodes 
that are in the successive stages
– If decoding of   is attempted within the mesh, then – as explained in the 
chapter 7.1 – the algorithm depends on relative location of the nodes
– The number of possible combinations further increases in case of the PS (see 
chapter 7.1.2)
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– Nodes may – and in case of a regular network will be – part of multiple net-
works and sessions
The  consequence  of  this  is  that  attackers  would  have  a  combinatorially  large 
amount of combinations of messages to permute through, each time attempting to de-
code RI, to be able to identify the to-be hops  of the outer-layer. As the size of the 
network grow, this will put attackers into the following situation:
– Low presence keeps the chances of the attackers very low (see chapter 7.2.2)
– In case of high presence attacker soon face computationally infeasible situation
As our interest lies in finding the upper bound on some CAs' chances to decode RI, 
subsequent analysis of the extent of the difficulties attacker face when attempting to 
compromise anonymity is outside of the scope of the MT.
7.2 Simulations
There are multitudes of strategies a node   may follow when trying to build its in-
ner-layer.  Unless  we make  any special  assumption  on   having helpers,  the  best 
strategy for  is to randomly choose  nodes from the pool of available nodes. 
By best we mean the fact that this is the situation when in a simple network attackers 
have no means of  biasing  towards acquiring favourable (from the anonymity's 
point of view: unfavourable) presence and/or location within the network. By simple 
network we mean the fact that no additional mechanism (e.g. Reputation System) is 
present that may allow  to know or to make assumption on who the malicious nodes 
are.
For the reason the paper [2] has not mentioned any such technique to be imple-
mented, we assume that   will be aware of sufficiently large amount of peer nodes 
that are ready to serve the purpose of inner- or outer-layer relay nodes. In a real-world 
implementation being ready means that the node is online, it is running the client that 
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executes the anonymity protocol and it will do its best to fulfil its purpose (which ulti-
mately depends on whether it is a normal or malicious nodes).
During normal operation of the network,  will select  different re-
lays from among these nodes and attempt to contact  through them via the known 
techniques. Because of this, our simulation will follow this behaviour of the network. 
Before presenting the results, let us spare some words on the details of the two differ-
ent types of simulations we have run and of the our motivation behind each.
Due to the fact that the ES is fairly vague with regard to the level of explanation in 
provides on the details of its simulations, our first target was to reproduce the results  
of the paper to be able to compare ours to them. The details of this attempt is dis-
cussed in chapter 7.2.2.
Based on this we have established high level of confidence that both the original 
paper and we interpret anonymity the same way and that our sets of simulations also 
yield the same results under the same initial conditions. Based on this, we also run a 
series of simulations different in nature from that of the paper. The reason for this is 
that – we believed – our model reflects the real-life situation better and gives a wider 
perspective  of  the  correlation  between  all  existing  network  parameters  of  the  in-
ner-layer,  such as  ,  ,   and   (proportional  presence of  cooperating malicious 
nodes in the network).  The details of  the methods and results of these simulations 
shall be described in chapter 7.2.3.
7.2.1 Base Setup
In all cases our simulations have consisted of the following steps:
1. We fixed parameters  and  , set   (referring to the ES) and iteration 
value 
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2. Under  these conditions  our  simulation engine  generated  independent  in-
ner-layers with specific type of presence of CAs at  random locations. The 
type of presence was either  fixed at   (see  chapter  7.2.2) or   proportional 
(see chapter 7.2.3)
3. We evaluated whether CAs would be able to decode  in case of the gener-
ated network layout.
◦ For the ES ( ) this evaluation has been done based on the criteria 
described under chapter 7.1.1
◦ In case of the PS ( ) we used the criteria discussed in chapter 7.1.2
4. The basic parameters ,  and  have been changed according to the type of 
simulation and execution has been restarted from step 2
5. The value of  has been increased by about one magnitude and the steps has 
been rerun starting from step 2
During  the  simulations   has  taken  the  values  of  ,  , 
 and finally  so that we would be alarmed by lack of con-
vergence of the simulations' output. As the results have converged sufficiently already 
at , we expect our simulations to reflect the real-life scenario close enough 
to be able to serve the basis for evaluation. All the results presented shortly are based 
on the case of  only. Finally the simulation engine has saved all its val-
ues into binary and text files for later processing.
In the  subsequent  chapters  we will  refer  to  confidentiality  being the 
chance that attackers can not decode RI. In other words . The original paper 
also refers to confidentiality under the abbreviation .
7.2.2 Comparison to the Paper's Results
Before presenting the simulation results we would like to shortly discuss the fol-
lowing of the assumptions the paper  [2] made: according to their model the first 
stage of nodes ( ) in each inner-layer is not malicious.
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We believe that either such assumption is groundless, or makes the areas where 
the ES can be used very limited, simply because in a general P2PN most of the peers 
do not have the means to guaranty such assumption to be valid, while failing to meet 
it would greatly declare the chances of  to maintain anonymity.
Due to this – until proven otherwise – we made the evaluation of the PS without 
this assumption being present.  However only at this stage, when trying to compare 
the results of the paper [2] and those that were calculated by our simulations, we will 
maintain this assumption.
To be able to compare the performance of the anonymity of the two schemes, we 
first attempted to reproduce the results presented in the paper under their “Fig. 3”. For 
this purpose we have executed the earlier explained simulation with matching values 
of  , ,  and , while generating only situations when attacker is un-
able to acquire position at stage 1.  Here  stands for the fixed number of malicious 
nodes.
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Fig. 22: Validating proof of our simulation engine's correctness
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Fig. 22 does this comparison of our results with that of the paper (shown by their  
“Fig. 3”) through laying the two sets of curves on top of each other. Out curves are 
shown in the legend and are displayed with thin lines bearing X marks. The paper's 
curves are the dashed thick lines not listed in the legend. To avoid misunderstanding, 
we used similar color for every pair of curves that were generated under the same set 
of network parameters.
As visible in Fig. 22 there is a perfect overlap between the two sets of curves, suffi-
ciently showing that our simulation environment matches with theirs.
7.2.3 Our Set of Simulations
Based to the findings of and conclusions drawn in chapter 7.2.2, we have decided 
to detach from the original simulation technique and do our own independent set of 
analyses. The single idea in mind was to visualize the correlation between level of 
CR and the strength of the anonymity provided by the system in a real-world envi-
ronment.
Using the output of such simulations, a network designer would be able to build a 
notion of the underlying mechanisms and make educated design decisions regarding 
the network's basic parameters ,  and  so that both his expectation regarding error 
resilience and confidentiality would be met.
We  designed  simulations  that  would  compare  the  level  of  confidentiality 
provided by the ES and the PS with different redundancy values  under the same 
network configuration  and  and given that the level of malicious nodes' presence 
in the pool of available relay nodes is . In addition – and as hinted earlier – we aban-
doned the paper's idea of making assumptions on the whereabouts of the malicious 
nodes, so in our simulations CAs may take any position in the inner layer's relay mesh 
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with equal probability ( ). Under these conditions we have executed a full set of sim-
ulations – according to the explanation of chapter  7.2.1 – with   values ranging for 
 up to  using the stepping  (resulting in 15 steps each).
Fig. 23 shows the visualisation of this comparison in 2D for a selected set of  
pairs. These pairs have been selected so that those would represent deep ( ), 
rectangular ( ) and also shallow ( ) inner mesh networks to get a first im-
pression on how these variables affect confidentiality. Darker colours (with  boxes) 
show the anonymity performance of the ES ( ), while the lighter counterparts of 
those represent the same for the PS (  with diamond and  with cross).
To be able to draw a wider -spectrum conclusion on the correlation between the an-
onymity and all the parameters of the network, we have also created 3D images. The 
following 3 figures demonstrate the level of confidentiality in case of all values of 
,   and   (Fig.  24),  ,   and   
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Fig. 23: Comparison of confidentiality in the ES and in the PS
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(Fig. 25) and ,  and  (Fig. 26) while the average level of at-
tackers ( ) goes through the transition mentioned above.
Due to difficulty of representing 15 surfaces in a single figure, the 3 graphs need 
slight explanation. Each surface shows the level of confidentiality for specific value of 
 and for all the possible combinations of  and . What can also be seen is that – as 
expected – the level of confidentiality strictly monotonically decreases as the level 
of attackers' presence increases.
To allow the viewer to make a comparison of the 3 situations at a fixed value of of 
, we will also present 3 figures showing the behaviour of the confidentiality when 
. shows the case for the ES (Fig. 27), while and demonstrate PS with  
(Fig. 28) and  (Fig. 29), respectively.
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Fig. 24: Confidentiality in the ES
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Fig. 26: Confidentiality in the PS (r=2)
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Fig. 25: Confidentiality in the PS (r=1)
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Fig. 28: Confidentiality in the PS (r=1, p=0.21)
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Fig. 27: Confidentiality in the ES (p=0.21)
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Fig. 30: Confidentiality in the PS (r=2, p=0.45)
Fig. 29: Confidentiality in the PS (r=2, p=0.21)
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Due to the space constraints, we will not like to burden this MT with figures any 
further, except for Fig. 30, which shows the case of . The reason for 
including it is the presence of an interesting phenomenon (discussed in chapter 7.2.4).
7.2.4 Summary and Interpretation of the Simulation Results
Based on the simulation results explained and shown in the chapter, we would like 
to draw the following conclusions regarding the correlation between CR and level of 
offered confidentiality:
1. Churn resilience is inverse proportional to confidentiality
2. However  even in case of strong churn resilience and very  high level of at-
tacker presence (Fig. 30), there exist sufficient number of network config-
urations ( ) when the level of confidentiality is very high
As both CR and confidentiality are desirable properties, point 1 presents a trade-
off relationship between the two. In other words network designer has to decide net-
work parameters along this trade-off to achieve the required level of both. Fortunately 
point 2 says that high level of confidentiality can be achieved even in case of churn re-
silience and high level of attacker presence.
7.3 Further Comments
In this chapter we would like to draw attention to two relevant observations we 
made during our research.
7.3.1 Partial Decoding
Both the paper [2] and this MT analyse only the two situations when a given slice 
 is fully decodable or when it is not decodable at all. All modelling of the attacker's 
chances has been done based on this to be true. However we believe there exists a 3rd 
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alternative the provides some chances to the attacker to  compromise anonymity. An 
example of this is shown by Fig. 31 (cf. Fig. 20).
The only change we applied to this compared to  Fig. 20 is the removal of   
from the group of CAs. Because of this,  will be unable to decode the 1st  of 
 but  of it and all the other 4  vectors will be available for the attacker.
The ES assumes failure of compromising anonymity (in other words they assume 
presence of full confidentiality) in this situation, while we believe that the attacker did 
acquire some information on RI and has a higher chance of decoding RI compared 
to the situation when he got no message parts at all. For the attacker to decode MI, 
there would be nothing more to do than attempt decoding with all the possible  
values of the missing part, which is much less than the usual case of  (that repre-
sents the number of all the possible values of MI).
In the light of the discussion outlines in chapter  7.1.3, this is possible (feasible) 
only in very special cases, when the network parameters permit it or the attacker – for 
any reason – decides to spare no costs for a duration of time. While in most of the 
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Fig. 31: A case of partial decoding
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cases  decoding via this cumbersome way is  not feasible  for an attacker, we still be-
lieve that we should discuss some solutions to this problem.
The theoretical approach is to apply coding techniques to prevent attacker gaining 
information on the content of the  vectors. As attacker may gain access to additional 
information over  in steps (with the very low granularity of ), we are looking for 
a coding technique that would prevent access to  as long as less than  of it 
is decodable (  in case of the ES). The most obvious such scheme is a TSSS it-
self. For example if we decide to apply the second stage coding step demonstrated in 
Fig. 10 using (5,5) TSSS scheme, then the fact that  is not malicious will leave the 
group of attackers without any information on the RI. Needless to mention that in such 
case the excessive expansion of the total size of messages travelling over the network 
discussed in chapter 6.4.1 will take effect. It is always up to the designer of the actual 
network to fine tune the system parameters along this  other  trade-offs between the 
level of anonymity and network economy.
If perfect secrecy is not required, a much more practical solution would be to:
1. keep RI as small as possible (by design)
and
2. to refrain from embedding any validation code (e.g. CRC) into either  or 
Point 1 will limit the inter-dependency present within the RI, this way also limiting 
the attacker's chances of gaining side-information. If this point can not be directly met 
(e.g. IPv6 addresses do show a predictable pattern), then an appropriate compression 
algorithm may be applied to RI – before encoding it into   – to hide its statistical 
properties.
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Point 2 serves a similar purpose: trying to make the attacker unable to rule out too 
many of the outputs of the iterative decoding it did, based on some validation code 
that would indicate  erroneous output.  Unfortunately this  conflicts  with the mecha-
nisms of TR. In case TR is required, a validation code may still be kept, but done 
through a computationally expensive algorithm.
7.3.2 The First/last Nodes of the Outer- and the Inner-layers
Until now both the paper [2] and we drew equality between decoding all the RI 
and anonymity being conquered. In this chapter we would like to point out that this is 
not necessarily the case.
Let us look at  Fig. 1 again. What will an attacker who managed to decode the RI 
sent to  ,   and to   know? Based on  , attackers will know that somebody 
wants to use  to send something. Similarly  will tell that  is involved, while 
 identifies  to be a node in the chain. If the parameter  is fixed ( ), then the 
attackers already know not to look any further for RI.
Based on the information acquired until now, attackers know that from among , 
 and  one is the destination of a one-way anonymous messaging attempt, but the 
attacker does not – necessarily – know their order or the identity of .
To gain order information, attackers have to be members of the last stage of each 
mesh of the inner-layer. In other words at least one of the   nodes of each   
mesh has to be malicious. This holds, because – due to the network's structure – mem-
bers of the last stage are aware of their location, due to the fact that those send all their 
messages to one single destination ( ).
By gaining access to all RI and by taking positions in the last stages of the in-
ner-layers, attacker is able to identify the routing chain  and the 
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final destination   in it,  but this  still  does not identify  . Knowing neither  , nor 
what it wants to sent to  leaves the sender anonymity intact.
There are the following  two ways an attacker may still compromise anonymity, 
given that it already met the conditions explained above:
1.  is malicious: in this case the attacker completes the chain of OR routers 
and knows that  is contacting 
2. Any of the  nodes in any of the inner-layer networks is malicious: due 
to the network design, the first stage of the inner-layer mesh knows about be-
ing contacted directly by  (simply because they receive their inputs from one 
single node:  itself)
Due to these additional limitations being in place, the earlier results presented in 
this chapter (especially chapter  7.2.3) showing the strength of anonymity should be 
considered to be lower bounds on confidentiality.
8 Tampering Resilience
In this chapter we will define the terms  Tampering and  Tampering Resilience 
(TR) as opposed to churn, and propose a very simple scheme that allows us to extend 
the established CR to deal with tampering as well.
8.1 Tampering
Within this MT we define tampering the following way: Tampering is the pur-
poseful action of malevolent node(s) that aims at disrupting the communication of 
the  RI distribution  network. Based on this definition, The main difference between 
churn and tampering is the fact that churn occurs as a result of error situation that can 
not be attributed to purposefulness.
The tools of a tampering node  may fall into several categories, such as:
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1. Accepting incoming messages, but not sending anything in return within the 
available time frame
2. Sending multiple outputs
3. Forwarding corrupted ,  and/or  vectors
4. Any possible combination of the above
Please note the similarity and differences between churn and tampering and refer to 
chapter 6.2.5 as well.
8.2 An Extension of the PS to Cover Tampering
There  are  at  least  two basically approaches  to  implement  resilience  against  at-
tacker's attempt to disrupt the communication. One is computationally more demand-
ing but requires no changes to the system while the other would manifest a more com-
plex design but it may be less strenuous on .
Within this MT we will present the first approach by proposing a solution that im-
plements TR based on the already existing CR techniques. The basic idea is the fol-
lowing:
1. At   use  an  error  detection  coding  scheme,  such  as  Cyclic  Redundancy 
Check (CRC) code or Hash Function (HF) [7] (whichever is more conveni-
ent on the given platform) to create a fingerprint of the RI
2. Before slicing RI, embed its fingerprint into 
3. At each  do the decoding as explained earlier
4. Verify the fingerprint to be correct
5. In case of mismatch, simulate churn  branch failures all possible ways until 
the fingerprint of the decoded  produces a valid fingerprint
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We call this technique computationally costly due to the fact that step 5 requires at 
most  decoding cycles. Needless to say that by choosing an otherwise light-
weight inner- and outer-code [1][12] this stress on  can be eased considerably.
This scheme can also be integrated into our CR technique, the following way:
– If there has been any (e.g. ) node (in other words branch) failures during the 
decoding step (step 3), then decrease  by 
– Exclude those branches that have been detected to have failed from the per-
mutation used at step 5
9 Summary and Final Conclusions
In this MT we have presented an existing one-way anonymous communication 
system [2] that provides advantages over earlier solutions [14].
Next  we have  pointed out  its biggest  weakness being the  lack of  resilience 
against  node  failure (churn).  We  have  shown  that  a  double-redundant  coding 
scheme exists that can provide predictable churn resilience.
Based on the new scheme, we made detailed analysis of its performance with re-
spect to the level of anonymity it can provide in case of the presence of cooperating 
malicious nodes.
Finally we have introduced the term tampering being the purposeful and deliberate 
action of attackers to  disrupt anonymous  communication by whatever means they 
possesses as members of the forwarding mesh of the inner-layer. We have to pointed 
out the similarities and differences between tampering and churn and proposed a sim-
ple decoding scheme that would provide protection against tampering.
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Based on the outcome of our research we believe that:
– it is to the advantage of the existing design to be extended with our error re-
silience scheme
– our work gives the theoretical  and quantitative support  a network designer 
needs to be able to make educated design decisions (selecting the network pa-
rameters  ,  ,   and  ) along the  trade-off present between the level of re-
silience and anonymity provided by the system
10 Future Work
The paper describing the ES  [2] does not give details  on the method through 
which the inner-layer nodes are supplied with the necessary information – namely the 
network address of the node(s) in the next stage – to be able to execute the necessary 
forwarding algorithms. We believe that there are at least the following two improve-
ments that must be made in this area:
1. The obvious: describe the missing design principles
2. Analysis:
◦ Either show that such additional steps would not compromise the es-
tablished properties of the scheme
◦ Or point out the affected properties and analyze the effects of those on 
the overall system's anonymity properties
In addition to the need for clarifying important details left undisclosed, we believe 
there are at least three areas where the system may be further improved. The details of 
these are discussed in the following three chapters. The detailed analysis of each may 
be the subject of future research.
10.1 Replacing Onion Routing
As mentioned in chapter 5.1 the ES proposes the use of “traditional onion routing” 
as the coding scheme for the outer-layer. While OR is one of the first routing tech-
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nique that supports hiding of identity, we believe that replacing it by more specific and 
lightweight solutions would bring advantages to the overall system performance. In a 
typical anonymous network OR is used to support at least the following two features:
– Hiding the  correlation between a relay node's incoming and outgoing mes-
sages: this is necessary, when attackers have the capability of snooping on all 
the lines of all the nodes in the mesh. Such capability are very rarely assumed 
to be present, simply because such AP2P solutions are meant to run on very 
large network (such as the Internet itself), where no entity holds both the ac-
cess and computation power to be able to receive and process all the messages. 
If this assumption were to be present in the ES, then the inner-layer would fail 
anyway, simply because – as discussed earlier in details – a group of attackers 
being able to occupy the first stage is capable of decoding RI. However if at-
tackers are anyway capable of occupying all the positions of the outer-layer, 
then anonymity is broken, independently from other circumstances.
– Hiding the  routing information (network address of the subsequent hops) 
from other members of the OR chain: This is a feature that is completely un-
necessary in the ES, because routing information does not travel via the same 
path, but is distributed by the inner-layer
Removing OR would decrease the computational power required from the nodes of 
the outer-layer, allowing low-power entities to serve the purpose of relay in this net-
work. Increasing the number of non-malicious nodes is always welcome, as – unless it 
is easy to take control of such nodes – such action means that a given group of CAs 
will loose relative presence..
If the size of the actual secret that travels between  and  has recognizable size 
distribution, then it may be necessary for each relay to pad the outgoing messages with 
random data.
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10.2 Tailoring the Routing Information
We believe that with a specific design consideration in mind, it is possible to fur-
ther  increase the level  of  anonymity this  scheme may offer.  The ES assumes that 
anonymity is broken if the RI is decoded. While we believe this is not necessarily the 
case (see details in chapter 7.3.2), we do see a chance to definitely decouple the two, 
by designing the routing information a specific way. We see a chance that in case the 
RI follows the rules listed below, even decoding of all  pieces of RI gives a chance to 
 to hide its identity:
– Make the RI a pair of flow-id and network address (e.g. IPv4 or IPv6)
– Use random flow-id for each relay  separately
– Upon receiving such RI, expect the relays to maintain this pair of flow-id and 
network address in their memory until relevant OR routing request arrives or a 
timer expires
Now assume that a group of attackers manages to take positions in the inner-layers 
in a way that they succeed in decoding all  pieces of RI, but happen not to be able to 
occupy positions of the first first stages. In such situation attacker will not have infor-
mation on either the sender , nor the final destination , as the mismatching flow-
ids would not give grounds for being able to arrange these nodes into a chain of OR 
relays belonging to the same flow. While in a small network (where the number of 
concurrent transactions is small) the attackers will have a good chance to assume who 
is   from among   network addresses they uncovered, such chances would di-
minish in a bigger and busier network. By choosing the network parameter   low, 
network designer has a means of limiting the attackers' chances of taking hold of some 
of the first stages. We believe that in such network the attacker's only chance of com-
promising anonymity is through occupying all positions  , but this needs further 
research.
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10.3 Probabilistic System Parameters
Following the thought pattern of chapter 10.2 we see a chance of being able to fur-
ther  decrease the  attackers'  chances  of  reconstructing the  OR path  by making the 
length of it ( ) be determined session-by-session by probabilistic techniques. An ex-
ample of this could be the following scheme:
– Let  be determined or influenced by a Bernoulli experiment with 
– To allow the user to set a limit on the generated number
Implementation of such technique is easy, based on the random vector generator 
discussed in chapter 5.2 that is anyway to be present in the system (for the sake of the 
RVs)
Using this technique user may always have the sanctuary of plausible deniability 
by being able to say “that is not the node I contacted”, but this item also needs furhter 
attention.
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